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The 1990s promise to be an era of mental health litigation
whose outcomes that some predict will dwarf the settlements
awarded recently in lawsuits over sexual improprieties between
psychotherapists and their patients. One expert estimates that
over 17,000 claims will be filed in the next decade, with litiga-
tion costs in excess of $250 million.' These new cases emerged
as therapy patients began to accuse fathers and mothers, uncles
and grandfathers, former neighbors and teachers, psychothera-
pists and countless others of sexually abusing them years ago.2
Particularly noteworthy is that the accusers were not people
who have harbored in secret genuine memories of abuse, only
recently to work up the courage to tell trusted friends or psy-
chotherapists. These were not instances of the over 175,000
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1. Henry Saeman, Repressed Memory Claims Expected to Soar, 4 NAT'L PSY-
CHOLOGIST, May-June 1995, at 1-7.
2. See ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED
MEMORY (1994); Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, 48 AM. PSY-
CHOLOGIST 518 (1993).
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cases of substantiated cases of sexual abuse reported annually
in the United States.3
Instead, accusers stepped forth to confront their alleged abus-
ers after memories of sexual molestation were unearthed in
psychotherapy from layers of psychic sediment that kept these
recollections undisturbed in the unconscious, sometimes for
decades. In treatment, which in some instances we liken to a
"psychoarcheological" dig, therapists often use a variety of tools
to help "dust off' the patient's psychic landscape; tools or tech-
niques that intrinsically have enormous potential for creating
pseudomemories; tools that meet no known legitimate scientific
standard for validity and reliability;4 tools such as "suggestion,
social contagion, hypnosis, misdiagnosis, and the misapplication
of hypnosis, dreamwork, or regressive therapies"5 and others
described below that appear to have convinced many that they
are genuine survivors of childhood sexual abuse. More than a
few accusers have taken their alleged abusers to court in ap-
parent efforts to obtain damages for the psychological distress
they claim to have suffered. By 1994, over 800 of these cases
had already been brought before civil and criminal courts.6
Some defendants have been sent to jail.7
3. See 2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK & PSYCHIATRY (H.I. Kaplan & 1.: Sadock
eds., 5th ed. 1989); Mark Sauer & Jim Okerblom, Trial by Therapy, NAT'L REV., Sept.
6, 1993, at 30.
4. See generally LOFTUS & KETCHAM, supra note 2; RICHARD OFSHE & ETHAN
WATTERS, MAKING MONSTERS: FALSE MEMORIES, PSYCHOTHERAPY, AND SEXUAL HYSTE-
RIA (1994); MARK PENDERGRAST, VICTIMS OF MEMORY: INCEST ACCUSATIONS AND SHAT-
TERED LIVES (1995); MICHAEL D. YAPKO, SUGGESTIONS OF ABUSE: TRUE AND FALSE
MEMORIES OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL TRAUMA (1994); Fred H. Frankel, Adult Recon-
struction of Childhood Events in the Multiple Personality Literature, 150 AM. J. PSY-
CHIATRY 954 (1993); J. Hochman, Recovered Memory Therapy and False Memory Syn-
drome, 2 SKEPTIC 58 (1994); D. Stephen Lindsay & J. Don Read, "Memory Work" and
Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse, PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & LAW (forth-
coming 1996) [hereinafter "Memory Work"]; D. Stephen Lindsay & J. Don Read, Psy-
chotherapy and Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse: A Cognitive Perspective, 8 AP-
PLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 281 (1994); Loftus, supra note 2; Harrison G. Pope Jr. &
James I. Hudson, Can Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse Be Repressed?, 25 PSY-
CHOL. MED. 121 (1995).
5. Philip M. Coons, Reports of Satanic Ritual Abuse: Further Implications About
Pseudomemories, 78 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 1376, 1377 (1994).
6. Anita Lipton, Status of Lawsuits at Memory and Reality: Reconciliation, Mem-
ory and Reality: Reconciliation Conference, Baltimore, Md. (Dec. 1994).
7. See LAWRENCE WRIGHT, REMEMBERING SATAN (1994).
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As increasing numbers of people have had to defend them-
selves in criminal proceedings against sexual abuse allegations,
a curious problem has emerged. Because accusers often recover
memories of molestation in psychotherapy, a professional rela-
tionship that in many jurisdictions is privileged by law, the
defendant is at a distinct disadvantage in refuting the charges
brought against him or her (although the defender is typically
male). To defend successfully against these allegations, one
must have access to the clinical record to evaluate the extent to
which the therapy process itself may have created a complex
web of unsubstantiated or unverifiable memories and beliefs
about prior life events as traumatizing as sexual victimization.
Loftus' has articulated five assumptions that flow from the
notion that one can repress memories of prior experience and
then subsequently resurrect them in pristine form-an idea
that has virtually no support in controlled scientific studies in
either basic or applied psychological research.' To-wit:
(1) We are more prone than not to banish traumatic experi-
ences from consciousness completely, because they are too horri-
fying to contemplate;
(2) We usually do not remember these forgotten experiences
by any normal process, but only through special psychothera-
peutic techniques;
(3) These counseling interventions produce reliable and valid
recovery of memories;
(4) Before re-emerging to conscious awareness, the forgotten
experiences cause miserable symptoms and problems in living
for many people;"
8. See Loftus, supra note 2.
9. See DAVID S. HOLMES, The Evidence for Repression: An Examination of Sixty
Years of Research, in REPRESSION AND DISSOCIATION 85 (Jerome L. Singer ed., 1990);
see also David S. Holmes, Is There Evidence for Repression? Doubtful, 10 HARV. MEN-
TAL HEALTH LETTER 4 (1994).
10. This is not to say that people cannot forget horrible things that happened to
them; most certainly they can. But there is virtually no support for the idea that
clients presenting for therapy necessarily have extensive histories of abuse of which
they are completely unaware, and that there is a constellation of symptoms which
reliably distinguish survivors from others. See infra note 188.
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(5) "Psychoarcheological" excavations and reliving the forgot-
ten experiences supposedly cure diagnosable mental conditions
such as depression, chronic anxiety, panic attacks,
bulimia/anorexia, personality disorders, and others too numer-
ous to mention."
Notwithstanding scientific data, the runaway train of re-
pressed memory therapy charges onward: some therapists ap-
pear to hold beliefs that have immense potential for creating
pseudomemories; 2 others encourage patients to take their al-
leged abusers to court based on these newfound recollections. 3
Litigation has reached both civil and criminal courts. Although
beyond the scope of this article, an understanding of and famil-
iarity with civil cases is necessary to appreciate the full breadth
of the repressed memory problem.
A. Civil Suits
In addition to the wave of scientifically undisciplined/New
Age therapies alluded to above (and discussed in more detail
below) and possibly the blurring of a treatment provider's politi-
cal agenda with so-called therapeutic interventions, repressed
memory litigation has been driven to the shore by legislation
that has swept across America in the past six years.
Invoking a novel application of the "delayed discovery doc-
trine," the Washington State Legislature was the first to decide
that the statute of limitations in sexual abuse cases does not
begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the facts essen-
tial to the cause of the action.'4 Thus, in Washington and
about half of the states, plaintiffs can sue for recovery of dam-
11. See E. SUE BLUME, SECRET SURVIVORS: UNCOVERING INCEST AND ITS AFTEREF-
FECT IN WOMEN (1990); RENEE FREDERICKSON, REPRESSED MEMORIES: A JOURNEY TO
RECOVERY FROM SExUAL ABUSE (1992).
12. YAPKO, supra note 4, at 42-61; Debra A. Poole et al., Psychotherapy and the
Recovery of Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse: U.S. and British Practitioners' Opin-
ions, Practices, and Experiences, 63 J. CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCH. 426, 426-37
(1995).
13. Clinicians well-grounded in both the empirical and theoretical foundations of
effective psychotherapy are particularly appalled by this litigation trend; rarely can
dysfunctional family relationships be repaired, or alleged victims cured or truly com-
pensated for psychological trauma in the adversarial courtroom forum.
14. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West Supp. 1989).
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ages for injury suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse
anytime within three years of when they remember the molesta-
tion. Indeed, several states have adopted this posture without
legislation.15 Consequently, juries now hear cases in which
plaintiffs base their arguments on a bastardized version of
Freudian theory and the notion that one can, through the pro-
cess of psychotherapy, excavate pristine memories of sexual
abuse long buried in the unconscious under layers of mental
sediment.
These cases are difficult to defend, especially when the "evi-
dence" is as ephemeral as the spectral appearances used to
condemn young girls and women as witches in Salem, Massa-
chusetts over 300 years ago. 6 Because there is usually no cor-
roborating evidence in these cases, the prototypical repressed
memory trial ends up as a credibility contest between accuser
and accused. Consider, for example, the following five types of
cases: accuser's suits; retractor's suits; third-party suits; retrac-
tor/third-party suits; suits against self-help book authors.
1. Accuser's Suits
A typical case is that of twenty-four-year-old Mary D. who
sued her father, John D., claiming that she had been abused by
him from infancy until age twenty-three.' After at least six
months of psychotherapy, Mary recalled being manually
penetrated and masturbated by her father as both an infant
and a young child of two or three. In a declaration, Mary as-
serted that her therapist said that many of her psychological
problems were caused by the alleged sexual abuse. Further, her
apparent ability to repress these memories was interpreted in
therapy as a natural and adaptive coping response under the
circumstances.
15. Julie M.K. Murray, Comment, Repression, Memory, and Suggestibility: A Call
for Limitations on the Admissibility of Repressed Memory Testimony in Sexual Abuse
Trials, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 477, 477-78 & n.4 (1995).
16. See, e.g., JOHN P. DEMOs, ENTERTAINING SATAN: WITCHCRAFT AND THE CUL-
TURE OF EARLY NEW ENGLAND (1982).
17. Mary D. v. John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633, 634-35 (Ct. App. 1989).
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2. Retractor's Suits
A second wave of lawsuits has been initiated by retractors
who, while in therapy, came to believe they had been sexually
molested, but now realize that their memories are false. By
1994, about 300 people had recanted their allegations; some
had sued their former therapists and achieved six-figure settle-
ments or jury verdicts.18 For example, Laura Pasley, one such
plaintiff (an employee of the Dallas Police Department), walked
into her therapist's office with one problem, bulimia, and exited
with another: a belief that she had been an incest victim. 9
She was hypnotized in an attempt to resurrect memories of
traumatic abuse. She tore up telephone books in cathartic at-
tempts to alleviate her emotional pain. She reported experienc-
ing flashbacks which her therapist insisted were actual data
from her past. She described dreams, which were interpreted as
what actually happened to her years before, no matter how
bizarre. She remembered group sexual abuse, a dead man
hanging from a rope, and sexual abuse by animals. She de-
voured the required reading list, including titles such as The
Courage to Heal"0 and Healing the Child Within" that con-
tain disinformation about fundamental and well-established
characteristics of human memory. The result: Laura spent four
years with these memories, became disenchanted and downright
angry with her therapist, and finally realized that these recol-
lections, in effect, had been created in treatment. Only then
could she put her estranged family back together and have the
energy to sue her former therapist for malpractice. She was
awarded a sizable six-figure settlement."
18. See Lipton, supra note 6.
19. Laura E. Pasley, Misplaced Trust, reprinted in TRUE STORIES OF FALSE MEM-
ORIES 347 (Eleanor Goldstein & Kevin Farmer eds., 1993).
20. ELLEN BASS & LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL: A GUIDE FOR WOMEN
SURVIVORS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1988).
21. C. WHITFIELD, HEALING THE CHILD WITHIN: DISCOVERY AND RECOVERY FOR
ADULT CHILDREN OF DYSFUNCTIONAL FAMILIES (1987).
22. Another patient, Diana Halbrooks obtained a successful jury verdict against
the same therapist. Steve Blow, Memories Almost Split Their Family, DALLAS MORN-




A third set of cases is being filed by those accused of sexual
abuse on the basis of repressed and recovered memories. These
people take the offensive by filing negligence actions against
psychotherapists who they believe engendered pseudomemories
of molestation. The accused abusers demand compensation for
the psychological upheaval, ruined reputations and careers, and
the breakup of families that often follow the supposed recall of
childhood abuse. A California father, Gary Ramona, sued not
only the psychotherapists who treated his daughter, Holly, but
also the hospital where a portion of the treatment occurred.23
Ramona's daughter claimed that she had been molested by her
father between ages five and sixteen, including numerous times
with the family dog, Prince.24 These memories apparently sur-
faced after both sodium amytal and psychotherapy sessions
with her counselors.2
Ramona has been called "the first successful courtroom chal-
lenge to practitioners of 'recovered memory' therapy"26 for a
couple of reasons. First, it is the initial case in which a jury
awarded damages (over $ 500,000) to a family member against
a therapist for creating and reinforcing pseudomemories of
sexual abuse in a relative. Second, Ramona departed from typi-
cal negligence actions, wherein clients (not their relatives) sue a
therapist for failing to meet the standard of care extant at the
time of treatment. Instead, the patient's father was permitted
to sue his daughter's therapists, causing some commentators to
suggest that "anyone who is harmed by a false memory may, in
the future, recover damages." '
In Ramona, Holly had previously waived her physician-pa-
tient privilege when she initiated the litigation process by filing
suit against her father for sexual abuse.28 As a result, the
23. Ramona v. Isabella, No. 61898 (Super Ct. Napa City, Cal. May 13, 1994), re-
printed in Milo Geyelin, Lawsuits over False Memories Face Hurdles, WALL ST. J.,




27. J.G. Schneider, Legal Issues Involving 'Repressed Memory' of Childhood Sexual
Abuse, THE PSYCHOLOGIST'S LEGAL UPDATE, Aug. 1994, at 11.
28. Ramona v. Isabella, No. 61898 (Super. Ct. Napa City, Cal. May 13, 1994), re-
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plaintiff was able to gain access to these records, especially
because the process of therapy was distinctly at issue in the
malpractice action. But, one can imagine that third-party civil
plaintiffs will face insurmountable hurdles in efforts to prove
false memories due to inappropriate treatment interventions,
when unable to access the clinical record.
4. Retractor/Third-Party Suits
Recently, a combined retractor and third-party case was ar-
gued in Pittsburgh.29 In psychotherapy, Nicole Althaus, still a
teenager, developed memories of her parents molesting her
earlier in adolescence. After a heartbreaking fourteen-month
separation from them, she recanted her accusations, joined the
parents in suing the treating psychiatrist, and subsequently
received $272,000 in compensatory damages."
5. Suits Against Self-Help Book Authors
Two highly unusual legal cases have been filed by retractors
against authors whose books have been implicated in fostering
development and reinforcement of pseudomemories of abuse. In
Mark v. Zulli,3 the plaintiff sued her therapists and the au-
thor of The Courage to Heal Workbook, 2 arguing that the writ-
er represented herself as an expert in helping adults heal from
the effects of childhood sexual abuse-even those with no mem-
ories of molestation.3 The plaintiff also claimed that the writ-
er taught her to believe in recovered memories as accurately
representing past experience and deserving of uncritical and un-
printed in Geyelin, supra note 23, at B1.
29. Althaus v. Cohen, reprinted in Jon Schmitz, Malpractice Jury Told of
'Nightmare' in False Abuse Case, PITTS. POST GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 1994, at C1.
30. Cleared Parents Win Suit Against a Psychiatrist, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1994,
at A9. See Jon Schmitz, Juy Finds Psychiatrist Negligent in Treatment, PrT. POST-
GAZETTE, Dec. 17, 1994, at Al; Jon Schmitz, Malpractice Jury Told of W'ightmare' in
False Abuse Case, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 1994, at C1.
31. Mark v. Zulli, No. 075386 (Cty. of San Luis Obispo filed April 27, 1994).
32. LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL WORKBOOK (1990).
33. See Mark, No. 075386.
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qualified belief.34 As a result, Mark claimed to suffer severe
mental anguish and emotional distress.35
In David v. Jackson,36 the plaintiff sued her therapists and
the authors of The Courage to Heal"7 for fraud and misrepre-
sentation. Deborah David alleged that Bass and Davis promoted
their book through advertising which engendered ideas that fos-
tered false delusions of childhood sexual abuse.8 In David's
case, she left the therapist's office believing that she was a
victim of organized satanic ritual abuse 9 and that she had
Multiple Personality Disorder as a consequence."
6. Miscellaneous Suits
In addition to the actions described above, disputes about
repressed versus false memories have led to legal difficulties for
an array of unusual defendants.
One therapist found herself charged with negligence and
incompetence in the "recovered memory" treatment of a woman
who accused her father of sexually abusing her as a child.4'
She was notified by the state health department that she would
lose her license to practice unless she could successfully defend
against the charges.
A rather different dispute developed between a Salt Lake
City therapist and a local professor over recovered memories of
satanic ritualistic abuse. The professor criticized the therapist
for, among other things, not knowing the literature on memory
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. David v. Jackson, No. 540624 (Cty. of Sacramento filed May 16, 1994).
37. BASS & DAVIS, supra note 20.
38. Mark, No. 075386.
39. Despite extensive investigations by law enforcement officials, there appears to
be no evidence of widespread Satanic ritual abuse in the United States. See ROBERT
D. HICKS, IN PURSUIT OF SATAN: THE POLICE AND THE OCCULT (1991); ARTHUR LY-
ONS, SATAN WANTS You: THE CULT OF DEVIL WORSHIP IN AMERICA (1988); JEFFREY
S. VICTOR, SATANIC PANIC: THE CREATION OF A CONTEMPORARY LEGEND (1993); Ken-
neth V. Lanning, Satanic, Occult, Ritualistic Crime: A Law Enforcement Perspective,
THE POLICE CHIEF, Oct. 1989, at 62-83.
40. Mark, No. 075386.
41. Therapist Faces Charges in Case of 'Recovered Memory' of Sex Abuse, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 22, 1995, at B5.
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and suggestibility. The therapist sued the professor alleging def-
amation and seeking $1 million in damages."
Problems of a different kind faced a Florida woman, Donna
Serritella, who was charged with insurance fraud after she
tried to get Nationwide Insurance Company to pay for her inju-
ries related to recovered memories of sexual abuse.' According
to news reports, Serritella was nearly involved in an auto ac-
cident but escaped without injury-either to herself or her car.
About nine months later, she contacted her insurer stating that
she had flashbacks of sexual abuse caused by the near accident.
She demanded $25,000. While pursuing her demand, she also
sued her alleged abuser, and he filed a countersuit alleging
slander and malicious prosecution. During that case, evidence
emerged that indicated that she had remembered abuse on
numerous occasions preceding her near-accident. At last report,
Serritella was being held in jail in lieu of $5,000 bail.
One of the strangest cases of repressed memory led to free-
dom for a rather surprised defendant from Minnesota. Dennis
Truwe had been convicted of criminal sexual conduct in early
1994. In Truwe's first trial, a juror realized belatedly-after the
conviction but before sentencing-that she had been sexually
abused in childhood. Had her history been known at the time of
jury selection, she would not have been chosen. The judge de-
clared a mistrial, and his decision was upheld on appeal. Truwe
was tried again and acquitted."
B. Criminal Cases
Repressed memory cases present particularly interesting legal
challenges in criminal courts, since many states have extended
the statute of limitations for criminal child sex abuse charg-
es-most often to several years beyond the age of majority,
which is usually eighteen years. In a few states (e.g., Wyo-
ming), there is no statute of limitations for sex crimes against
children. Moreover, in more states moves are afoot to pass laws
42. Joan O'Brien, State Won't Help U. Professor in Defamation Suit, SALT LAKE
CITY TRIBUNE, Feb. 1, 1995, at B1.
43. Henry Kaylois, Fraud Charge Cites Claim of Recovered Memory, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, May 12, 1995, at 1.
44. Kevin Duchschere, Once Convicted, Maple Grove Man Now Free, MINNEAPOLIs
STAR TRIB., May 9, 1995, at B2.
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that would toll the statute of limitations and permit these types
of criminal prosecutions to go forward any time hidden memo-
ries are unearthed." Criminal prosecutions based upon de-re-
pressed memories of murder have now occurred in a number of
states because there is no statute of limitations for this particu-
lar crime.46  The most famous of these is Franklin v.
Duncan,47 in which George Franklin was convicted of murder
after his daughter, Eileen, claimed she witnessed the crime
twenty years earlier and repressed the memory. Then the recol-
lection surfaced.' Thus now, and perhaps more so in the fu-
ture, accused individuals are defending themselves against pros-
ecutions based on allegedly de-repressed memories. A battle
over therapy records typically ensues.
C. The Problem
In her initial foray into the litigation waters, Holly Ramona
sued her father after she uncovered a decade's worth of abuse
in therapy, and waived her right to the confidentiality of the
clinical record. Available to the defense were the following:
proof that Holly's therapist had told her during an initial ther-
apy session that seventy to eighty percent of people who suf-
fered from her presenting problem, bulimia, were child sex
abuse victims-a misleading if not purely erroneous piece of
information; proof that Holly attended group therapy sessions
in which sexual victimization was extensively discussed and the
45. See Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Repressed Memories, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1994, at
42.
46. For example, in 1994, a jury convicted an Indiana woman, Anita Vega, of
involuntary manslaughter in the death of her toddler daughter 25 years earlier.
Vega's oldest daughter said she suppressed the memory until she began having night-
mares about it in 1992 after receiving counseling. Mother Guilty of Child's 60's Death,
SACRAMENTO BEE, July 30, 1994, at A24, reprinted in Daughter with Nightmares
Helps to Convict Mother of a Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1994, at 34.
47. 884 F. Supp. 1435, rev'd on other grounds, 891 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(granting habeas relief in the form of a stay pending appeal). Among other reasons,
Judge Jensen reversed because the trial judge had denied the defense the ability to
introduce evidence that the daughter's memory had been reported in the public media
prior to testimony. The prosecutor had been permitted to argue, after the evidence
had been excluded, that Eileen's memory could only have been produced by a person
who actually witnessed the event. See LoFrus & KETCHAM, supra note 2, at 4.
48. Franklin, 884 F. Supp. at 1438. For an account of this case, see LoFrus &
KETCHAM, supra note 2.
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symptoms interpreted accordingly; and proof that Holly had
agreed to a sodium amytal ("truth serum") interview, after
having expressed reservations about her memories and being
assured that lying while under the influence of this drug was
virtually impossible. These facts were absolutely essential to
her father's ability to defend the allegations of abuse and to his
ultimately successful third-party lawsuit against the therapists.
But, what if Holly had not gone to a civil lawyer? Criminal
charges could have readily been brought since Holly was under
the age of majority at the time she "recalled" the alleged abuse.
In this hypothetical instance, her father would have faced an
even worse conundrum: undoubtedly, he would have sought
review of his daughter's therapy records, and Holly probably
would have denied him that access. After all, when a recent
rape victim testifies against her rapist, and she happens to be
in therapy at the time, she is not routinely required to disclose
her confidential therapy records. Why should a crime victim of
any sort have to disclose such private matters?
Just this sort of scenario was recently played out in two
repressed memory cases decided contemporaneously by the New
Hampshire Superior Court." The criminal prosecution of Joel
Hungerford was based on memories recalled by his daughter,
Laura B., who claimed that he had molested her more or less
continually for eighteen years beginning at age five. When
about twenty-five, she began therapy and recovered these mem-
ories of sexual abuse.5" Unusual here was that the judge ruled
that the state had the burden of proving: (a) the scientific legit-
imacy of memory repression, (b) the validity of veridical memo-
ry recovery through psychotherapy, and (c) that this kind of
treatment had gained general acceptance in the field of psychol-
ogy. During a two-week hearing, records were available for the
judge to confirm the witness's recollections of what went on in
therapy, because the defense filed motions for discovery and
49. State v. Hungerford, No. 94-5-045, 1995 WL 378571 (N.H. Sup. Ct., May 23,
1995); see also Christine Gorman, Memory on Trial, TIME, May 23, 1995, at 54.
50. Hungerford, 1995 WL 378571. The companion prosecution of John Morahan
was based on memories of a former student, Sarah F., who claimed that her teacher
had raped and impregnated her when she was 13. Over five years later, while in
therapy, she recovered this memory. Id.
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PATIENT-PSYCHOTHERAPIST PRIVILEGE
depositions to challenge the validity of the allegedly repressed
memories.5 The defense sought:
Any and all counselling and or therapeutic records per-
taining to psychiatric, psychological, therapeutic or any
other mental health counselling of [complainant] from 1992
to the present, including but not limited to the following:
1. Any notes, correspondence or memoranda generated by
said counsellors;
2. Any audiotapes, videotapes, or drawings generated
during counselling sessions or at the requests of said coun-
sellors;
3. The title, author, publisher of any books, articles, vid-
eotapes provided [by] said counsellor to [complainant] for
reading and/or consultation."
In one motion, the defense asserted the need for the
complainant's therapy records to challenge, in pretrial proceed-
ings, the reliability of repressed memories. "If this matter were
ever to be before a trier of fact, not only must the defense ar-
gue that the incidents in the repressed memories did not occur,
but the defendant must also be prepared to address the jury's
question that if these memories are untrue, how did they oc-
cur?"
53
As the defense understood all too well, the complainant's
entire therapy had to be explored. When the State objected on
the grounds that the records were privileged, the defense re-
sponded that the privilege in New Hampshire, while recognized,
was not absolute. Prior New Hampshire cases in which the
privilege balancing act tilted against the patient included a civil
action in which the plaintiff put her medical condition at issue
in a malpractice case' and a criminal case in which the
treatment records of the state hospital were introduced at a
defendant's recommitment hearing.55 In short, the physician-
patient privilege was not absolute and could yield when the
51. Memorandum of Law Supporting Dependent's Second Motion for Discovery
and Motion for Depositions, State v. Hungerford, No. 94-5-45, 1995 WL 378571 (N.H.
Sup. Ct., May 23, 1995).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Nelson v. Lewis, 534 A.2d 720, 722 (N.H. 1987).
55. State v. Kupchun, 373 A.2d 1325 (N.H. 1977).
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disclosure of information was essential. Indeed, the records in
their entirety were needed both to assess the validity of the
process by which the clinician reached the diagnosis" and the
possibility that "suggestive influences may have been operating
in the hands of the complainant's therapist."57
The clinical record well represents the kind of treatment
process which many of these patients appear to have under-
gone. In Laura B.'s case, she began therapy in 1992 with a
social worker seeking treatment for symptoms of clinical depres-
sion and sexual problems in her marriage." She had no mem-
ories of any sexual abuse. 9 However, her sister claimed to be
recovering memories of abuse by their father, which led Laura
to wonder about her own history. ° Analysis of her treatment
record indicated that based on the presenting symptomatology,
one of her therapist's stated goals was to recover memories of
possible sexual abuse.6 Along the way, the clinician had a
joint therapy session with both the patient and her sister, dur-
ing which the latter's claims of sexual abuse were discussed.62
After about nine months and approximately 100 psychotherapy
sessions, Laura B. would eventually "remember" abusive epi-
sodes including an unremembered rape that occurred two days
before her wedding a few years earlier.6" The clinical record
clearly indicated that these recollections were induced via a
variety of techniques such as guided visualization, dream inter-
pretation, body pain analysis, and other interventions.' In-
56. Id. at 1327. In this case, a defense psychiatrist stated in an affidavit that
'patients with many types of psychiatric disorders are commonly diagnosed as being
victims of childhood sexual abuse, and/or having so-called post-traumatic stress disor-
der. For example, the psychomotor agitation, anhedonia, impairments of sleep, appe-
tite, and libido, feelings of guilt, and other symptoms of major depression are often
misconstrued to represent after-effects of trauma when, in fact, these symptoms are
characteristics of major depressive illness in individuals with no history of trauma at
all." See Aft. of James Irvin Hudson, MD at 1, State v. Kupchun, 373 A.2d 1325
(N.H. 1977).
57. Aft. of James Irvin Hudson, MD at 3, State v. Kupchun, 373 A.2d 1325 (N.H.
1977).









deed, it appeared from the records that the therapist 'educated'
Laura about repression, affirmed Laura's memories, and vali-
dated her abuse.65
After a two-week hearing during which the science of memo-
ry, memory repression, and its applicability to the facts of the
present case were thoroughly aired, the judge ruled that the
state had not met its burden and the women would not be
permitted to testify at trial.66 In reaching his opinion, the
judge also analyzed the process of psychotherapy, finding that
the approach used in these cases was highly suggestive and
"not scientifically reliable," and that it "thoroughly and system-
atically violated the guidelines and standards of the practice of
psychotherapy." "
D. Patient Privacy and Defendant Liberty
This case illustrates well the problem that defendants face in
repressed memory trials. For instance, Hungerford demonstrates
classic tensions between the rights of privacy of a patient who
claims to be a victim of a crime (or on other occasions a wit-
ness to a crime) and the defendant's due process rights guaran-
teed under the Constitution." The Sixth Amendment secures
"at a minimum,... the right [of criminal defendants] to put
before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of
guilt."69 Of course, trial judges have the right to exclude evi-
dence that is confusing, misleading or prejudicial, but that right
usually yields to a defendant's constitutional right "to present
all relevant evidence of significant probative value to the de-
fense."' ° The criminal defendant in a typical repressed memory
65. Id. Therapy records were also made available concerning the alleged victim,
21-year-old Sarah F., in the companion case. While the facts of Sarah F.'s allegations
are somewhat different, the analysis in her case revealed that she had attended a
"therapeutic boarding school," and her memories were recovered using hypnosis, "in-
ner child therapy," and other activities aimed at ferreting out suspected abuse. She
accused many other individuals before settling on her seventh grade teacher, defen-
dant Morahan, who she claimed raped her when she was 13.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See generally id.
69. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987).
70. People v. Babbitt, 755 P.2d 253, 265 (Cal. 1988) (citing People v. Reeder, 872
147 Cal. Rptr. 275 (Ct. App. 1978)).
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case argues that minute details of the therapy process are criti-
cal to a showing that the purported de-repressed memories
could have arisen in some way other than genuine forgetting
and remembering. Clearly, access to the clinical record is essen-
tial to guarantee a defendant due process. However, much of
the work conducted in effective psychotherapy might well be
significantly hampered should patients perceive the relationship
to be in fact routinely open to scrutiny.
E. Confidentiality and Privilege in Psychotherapy
1. Confidentiality
While axiomatic to note, individuals usually begin psycho-
therapy wanting to learn new and more effective ways for cop-
ing with life difficulties.7' They seek help for problems in
thinking, behavior, or emotional expression/regulation which
significantly impair everyday social and occupational function-
ing. In repressed memory cases, some patients evolve to pres-
ent as "survivors" who meet the diagnostic criteria for Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or Dissociative Identity Disor-
der (DID) (formerly called Multiple Personality Disorder)."
71. See generally LORNA S. BENJAMIN, INTERPERSONAL DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT
OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS (2nd ed. 1996).
72. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N & TASK FORCE ON DSM-IV, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-lV (4th ed. 1994).
73. With PTSD, the patient describes having experienced an event that involved
threat to one's physical integrity coupled with intense fear and feelings of helpless-
ness and seems causally linked with the following four types of symptom clusters: the
tendency to re-experience the traumatic event (e.g., via flashbacks or disturbing
dreams); the tendency to avoid activities or situations that remind one of the trauma;
the tendency to show reduced responsiveness to the external world (e.g., feeling de-
tached from others or emotionally numb); and the tendency to display increased
arousal (e.g., an exaggerated startle response, sleep problems, or concentration dif-
ficulties). For extensive discussions of this disorder and methods used to distinguish
it from malingering or deliberately faking symptoms when there is an external (e.g.,
financial) incentive to do so, see ROBERT I. SIMON, POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER
IN LITIGATION: GUIDELINES FOR FORENSIC ASSESSMENT (1995); Alan A. Stone, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Law: Critical Review of the New Frontier, 21 BUL-
LETIN AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 23, 23-36 (1993).
With DID, the patient appears to display two or more distinct and fully devel-
oped personalities (i.e., each with his/her own characteristic thought, feeling, and
action pattern), and some clinicians believe the disorder's origins may be found in a
history of extensive-often sexual-abuse. For clinical descriptions of this phenomenon
see Phillip M. Coons et al., Multiple Personality Disorder: A Clinical Investigation of
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Regardless of a patient's psychiatric diagnosis, psychotherapists
typically believe that the intensity and extent of emotional
pain, shame, and inadequacy felt by many persons in treatment
must be understood thoroughly, carefully, and accurately for
therapy to help the person feel better and function more effec-
tively in the world.
To obtain reliable and valid assessments of psychological
conditions or disorders, clinicians have long assumed the neces-
sity of ensuring patients a confidential psychotherapy environ-
ment.'4 Such an assumption seems like just plain common
sense: encouraging patients to disclose "the unspeakable [and]
the unthinkable ... requires an atmosphere of unusual trust,
confidence, and tolerance....
In this regard, empirical research supports common sense
and clinical lore. While some investigators report that failing to
assure privacy does not significantly inhibit self-disclosure, 6
50 Cases, 176 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 519 (1988); RICHARD P. KLUFT, CHILD-
HOOD ANTECEDENTS OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY (1985); Frank W. Putnam et al., The
Clinical Phenomenology of Multiple Personality Disorder: Review of 100 Recent Cases,
47 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 285 (1986); Colin A. Ross et al., Abuse Histories in 102
Cases of Multiple Personality Disorder, 36 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 97 (1991); Colin
A. Ross et al., Multiple Personality Disorder: An Analysis of 236 Cases, 34 CANADIAN
J. OF PSYCHIATRY 413 (1989).
Detailed case examples of both PTSD and DID may be found in R.L. SPIrZER,
DSM-IV CASEBOOK: A LEARNING COMPANION TO THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994).
74. PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIA-
TRY AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1991); ROBERT LANGS, PSYCHOTHERAPY: A BASIC TEXT
(1982); Paul Chodoff, Psychiatry and the Fiscal Third Party, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1141 (1978); Joseph Dubey, Confidentiality as a Requirement of the Therapist: Techni-
cal Necessities for Absolute Privilege in Psychotherapy, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1093
(1974); Henry H. Foster, Jr. & Doris J. Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM.
L.Q. 343 (1972); Ryan D. Jagim et al., Mental Health Professionals' Attitudes Toward
Confidentiality, Privilege, and Third-Party Disclosure, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 458 (1978);
Mildred M. Reynolds, Threats of Confidentiality, 21 SOC. WORK 108 (1976); Alan 0.
Ross, Confidentiality in Child Guidance Treatment, 42 MENTAL HYGIENE 60 (1979);
Max Siegel, Privacy, Ethics, and Confidentiality 10 PROF. PSYCHOL. 249 (1979).
75. CLIFFORD D. STROMBERG ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGISS LEGAL HANDBOOK 371
(1988) (quoting Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 674-76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (citations
omitted)).
76. See B. Kobocow, The Influence of Confidentiality Conditions on Self-Disclosure
of Early Adolescents, 14 PROF. PSYCH.: RES. & PRAC. 435 (1983); John M. McGuire et
al., Depth of Self-Disclosure as a Function of Assured Confidentiality and Videotape
Recording, 64 J. OF COUNS. & DEy. 259, 261 (1985); Thomas Muehlman et al., In-
forming Clients About the Limits to Confidentiality, Risks, and Their Rights: Is Self-
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the body of empirical research indicates that confidentiality
increases the likelihood that people will report psychological
symptoms," encourages people to seek help, 8  and generally
promotes more frequent and intimate self-disclosure."
Furthermore, competent and ethical clinicians are quite sensi-
tive to the importance of confidentiality in psychotherapy for
three additional reasons. First, practitioners of any number of
scientifically validated approaches to psychotherapy ° share a
common foundation. The treatment crucible is the patient and
therapist's relationship. Successful outcome reflects directly the
Disclosure Inhibited? 16 PROF. PSYCH.: RES. & PRAC. 385, 395 (1985); Bruce Pickens,
1992 The Effects of Explaining Client Rights and Limits to Confidentiality on Subse-
quent Self-Disclosure in a Client Population, 52 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTL 4983-B
(1992); see also Lorraine Wodiska, Concern About Confidentiality: Its Relationship to
Self-Disclosure and Group Climate in a Small Group Setting, 48 DISSERTATION AB-
STRACTS INT'L 279-B, 280-B (1987).
77. See Paul J. Lane, Effects of Complete and Limited Confidentiality on Self-Dis-
closure, 40 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT'L 2845-B (1979); J.R. McNamara, Confiden-
tiality: It's Effect on Interviewee Behavior, 11 PROF. PSYCH. 714-21 (1980); David
Nowell & Jean Spruill, If It's Not Absolutely Confidential, Will Information be Dis-
closed?, 24 PROF. PSYCH.: RES. & PRAc. 367, 368 (1993).
78. See Jacob J. Lindenthal & Claudewell S. Thomas, Psychiatrists, the Public,
and Confidentiality, 170 J. OF NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE 319, 321 (1982); Thom-
as V. Merluzzi & Cheryl Brischetto, Breach of Confidentiality and Perceived Trustwor-
thiness of Counselors, 30 J. OF COUNS. PSYCH. 245, 250-51 (1983); David J. Miller &
Mark H. Thelen, Knowledge and Beliefs About Confidentiality in Psychotherapy, 17
PROF. PSY.: RES. & PRAC. 15, 17-18 (1986); Donald Schmid et al., Confidentiality in
Psychiatry: A Study in the Patient's View, 34 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY, 353,
354-55 (1983); M.F. Weiner & D.W. Shuman, The Privilege Study, 40 ARCHIVES OF
GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 1027 (1983).
79. Thomas 0. Bennett, The Effects of Confidentiality Instructions on Symptom
Admission, Socially Desirable Responding, and Self-Disclosure, Among Clinical and
Non-Clinical Populations in a Rural Setting, 42 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTER'L
2977, 2978 (1982); Robert I. Edelman & Roderick Snead, Self-Disclosure in a Sim-
ulated Psychiatric Interview, 38 J. OF CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 354, 354
(1972); Gabriel Y. E1-Hage Boutros, The Effects of Confidentiality and Subjects' Race
on Subjects' Symptom Admission, Socially Desirable Responding, and Projected Self-
Disclosure in Psychotherapy, 46 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT'L 2456-B (1986).
80. For sophisticated reviews of empirical psychotherapy outcome research indi-
cating that treatment significantly increases the level of functioning of patients rela-
tive to untreated controls, see MARY L. SMITH ET AL., THE BENEFITS OF PSYCHOTHER-
APY (1980); Paul Crits-Christoph et al., Meta-Analysis of Therapist Effects in Psycho-
therapy Outcome Studies, 2 PSYCHOTHERAPY RES. 81-91 (1991); Mary L. Smith &
Gene V. Glass, Meta-Analysis of Psychotherapy Outcome Studies, 32 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 752, 760 (1977). For a more general discussion of psychotherapy effectiveness,
see Mental Health: Does Therapy Help?, Consumer Reports, November, 1995 at 734;
Martin E.P. Seligman, The Effectiveness of Psychotherapy: The Consumer Reports
Study, 50 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 965, 974 (1995).
126
1996] PATIENT-PSYCHOTHERAPIST PRIVILEGE
quality of that relationship: the extent to which treatment oc-
curred in a confidential atmosphere of mutuality, collaboration,
acceptance, understanding, trust and other non-specific relation-
ship factors.8 Second, ethical guidelines published by every
major professional organization whose members practice psycho-
therapy, specifically require them to safeguard patient confiden-
tiality and to disclose information only when permitted or ex-
plicitly demanded by law.82 Third, in most jurisdictions, mental
health records are protected by the privilege of confidentiality,
which may be broken only in very circumscribed instances, such
as in cases of suspected child/elder abuse and when patients
are threats to themselves, others, or cannot care for themselves.
2. Privilege and the Legal Right to Inspection
Nevertheless, access to the psychotherapeutic records of vic-
tims in criminal actions is more and more widely litigated.
Whether there is access to these records is a state-specific ques-
81. See LORNA S. BENJAMIN, supra note 71; SHELDON CASHDAN, OBJECT RELA-
TIONS THERAPY: USING THE RELATIONSHIP (1988); JEFFERSON M. FISH, PLACEBO THER-
APY (1973); JEROME D. FRANK, PERSUASION AND HEALING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
PSYCHOTHERAPY (1991); Arthur K. Shapiro & Louis A. Morris, The Placebo Effect in
Medical and Psychological Therapies, reprinted in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AND
BEHAVIOR CHANGE 369 (Sol L. Garfield & Allan E. Bergin eds., 2d ed. 1978); G.T.
Evans & Ian M. Evans, The Therapist-Client Relationship in Behavior Therapy, re-
printed in EFFECTIVE PSYCHOTHERAPY, A HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH 544, 553 (Alan S.
Gurman & Andrew M. Razin eds., 1977); Sean O'Connell, The Placebo Effect and
Psychotherapy, 20 PSYCHOTHERAPY THEORY, RES. & PRAC. 337, 339, 342-43 (1983);
Carl R. Rogers, The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Therapeutic Personality
Change, 21 J. CONSULTING PSYCH. 95, 95-100 (1957).
82. See generally AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR MARRIAGE AND FAMILY THERAPY,
AAMET CODE OF ETHICS (1991); AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SEX EDUCATORS, COUN-
SELORS AND THERAPISTS, CODE OF ETHICS (1993); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS AND CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS (1994); AMERICAN NURSES ASSOCIATION, CODE FOR NURSES WITH
INTERPRETIVE STATEMENTS (1985); ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE ETHICS COMMITrEE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL
ETHICS WITH ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY 3 (1992); AMERI-
CAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE
OF CONDUCT 5.02, 5.05 (1992); Association for Specialists in Group Work, Ethical
Guidelines for Group Leaders, 7 JOURNAL OF SPECIALISTS IN GROUP WORK 174 (1983);
Feminist Therapy Institute, Feminist Therapy Code of Ethics, in FEMINIST ETHICS IN.
PSYCHOTHERAPY 37-40 (Hannah Lerman & Natalie Porter eds., 1990); NATIONAL ASSO-
CIATION OF ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE COUNSELORS, ETHICAL STANDARDS OF ALCO-
HOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE COUNSELORS (1991); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL
WORKERS, CODE OF ETHICS (1993).
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tion. Access can be obtained, however, under at least limited
circumstances in most, though by no means all, jurisdictions.
The theories, which vary from state to state, range from the
straightforward belief that clinical records are not privileged in
the first instance, to the theory that the defendant has a consti-
tutional right to at least limited access to the treatment re-
cords.
3. Constitutional Claim-Pennsylvania v. Ritchie
Any constitutional claim of access to the records must begin
with an understanding of the United States Supreme Court's
plurality decision in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie. 3 In Ritchie, the
defendant was charged with, among other crimes, the rape of
his thirteen-year-old daughter. The victim claimed that she had
been assaulted by the defendant two or three times per week
for four years. She reported these assaults to the police who
then contacted Child Welfare Services (CWS), a government
agency responsible for investigating mistreatment and neglect of
children.'
Ritchie made a pretrial request for CWS records related to
the victim, including both the current charges as well as to a
previous investigation. 5 The agency refused to release the doc-
uments, and claimed that they were privileged under Pennsyl-
vania law."8 Ritchie moved for sanctions against CWS, but the
trial court held that "no medical records are being held by CWS
that would be of benefit to the defendant."87 On appeal, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed with Ritchie's argument
that the lower court's refusal to order production of the docu-
83. 480 U.S. 39 (1987). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun
and O'Connor joined the opinion written by Justice Powell. Justice Blackmun, how-
ever, disagreed with the Court's narrow interpretation of the Confrontation Clause's
relevance to pretrial discovery, but nonetheless concurred because the result was
adequate to meet the Confrontation Clause concerns. Id. at 65. Justices Brennan and
Marshall dissented based upon the Court's narrow reading of the Confrontation
Clause. Id. at 72. Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall and Scalia dissented, believing
the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 78.
84. Id. at 43.





ments violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment,88 as applied to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."89 The court ordered an
in camera review by the trial court with the defendant having
access to any verbatim statements made by the victim.0 On
appeal by the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia agreed that there had been a violation of both the Con-
frontation Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause." Thus,
the court held that the defendant's lawyer was entitled to re-
view the entire file to search for any useful information.2
Addressing the Confrontation Clause claim, the Supreme
Court of the United States stated that the clause only guaran-
tees the right physically to face adverse witnesses and the right
to cross-examine those witnesses.93 The Court stated, however,
[t]he ability to question adverse witnesses ... does not
include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any
and all information that might be useful in contradicting
unfavorable testimony. Normally the right to confront one's
accusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude
at trial to question witnesses. In short, the Confrontation
Clause only guarantees "an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in what-
ever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might
wish."94
The Court also rejected the defendant's Compulsory Process
Clause argument, stating that the Court had never held that
the Clause guaranteed the right to discover the identity of
88. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
89. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 45 & n.5 (construing Ritchie, 472 A.2d at 225); U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
90. Ritchie, 472 A.2d at 225.
91. The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
92. Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 502 A.2d 148, 153. (Pa. 1985). The court stated:
"When materials gathered become an arrow of inculcation, the person inculpated has
a fundamental constitutional right to examine the provenance of the arrow and he
who aims it." Id.
93. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 39.
94. Id. at 53, (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam)
(footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
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witnesses. 5 The Court stated that it had traditionally evaluat-
ed such claims under the Due Process Clause and, in any
event, the Compulsory Process Clause gave the defendant no
more rights than did the Due Process Clause.96 Under this
rationale, the Court held that the defendant did not have a
right to unlimited access to the records.97
While recognizing the public interest in protecting from dis-
closure sensitive information such as that contained in the
CWS records, the Court held that such interest did not prevent
disclosure in all circumstances. In what may be a critical dis-
tinction, the Court pointed out that the Pennsylvania statute
failed to provide an unqualified privilege." Indeed, the statute
specifically allowed disclosure when court ordered, and, empha-
sizing the importance of this distinction, the court "express[ed]
no opinion on whether the result in this case would have been
different if the statute had protected the CWS files from disclo-
sure to anyone, including law enforcement and judicial person-
nel."99
The Court, however, held that the defendant did not have a
right to unlimited access to the records, remarking that
"[a]lthough the eye of the advocate may be helpful to a defen-
dant in ferreting out information... this Court has never
held-even in the absence of a statute restricting disclo-
sure-that a defendant alone may make the determination as
to the materiality of the information."'00  Rather, the
defendant's rights and interests could be protected by submit-
ting the records for an in camera inspection by the trial
judge. 1 1
What is critical to an understanding of any constitutional
argument concerning access to clinical records is:
95. Id. at 56.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 61.
98. Id. at 57-58.
99. Id. at 58 n.14.
100. Id. at 59 (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 60.
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1) If there is an absolute privilege, the United States
Supreme Court may well uphold a refusal to provide any
access;
2) Where the privilege is not absolute, a defendant's due
process rights can be adequately protected by in camera
review by the trial judge alone;
3) A defendant cannot require the trial court to review
the records "without first establishing a basis for [a] claim
that it contains material evidence."1 2
4. State Court Interpretations Following Ritchie
Since Ritchie, courts have had little difficulty dealing with
routine discovery requests in circumstances where it was clear
that the privilege attempted to be invoked was not absolute.
Since at least a year before Ritchie was decided, California
courts have used a five-step process to govern discovery re-
quests concerning the psychotherapy records of nonparty wit-
nesses, including victims. In People v. Reber,1°' the court was
confronted with the claim that California's psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege precluded release of the records of complaining
witnesses in a criminal action in which the defendants were
charged with sexual and nonsexual assaults.' Relying on the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, the court held that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege must give way.' 5  Stating
that "[c]ertain types of mental disorders are highly probative on
the issue of a witness' [sic] credibility,"0 6 the court held that
"adherence to a statutory privilege of confidentiality must give
way to pretrial access when it would deprive a defendant of the
constitutional right of confrontation and cross-examination." 7
The court in Reber articulated the five steps necessary to an
analysis of when a court's decision to withhold subpoenaed
documents may constitute error. First, the defendant must
102. Id. at 58 n.15.
103. 223 Cal. Rptr. 139 (Ct. App. 3d 1986).
104. Id. at 139.
105. Id. at 144.
106. Id. at 145.
107. Id. at 146 (citation omitted).
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establish "good cause" for the discovery. °8 Second, upon such
a showing, the trial court, in deciding whether to release the
information, should review the records in camera. Third, the
court should weigh the constitutional right to cross-examine
against the statutory privilege. Fourth, the court should deter-
mine if any of the privileged materials are essential to the
vindication of the defendant's constitutional right. Finally, the
court must make an adequate record for review. °9
Even after the plurality's rejection of the Confrontation
Clause argument in Ritchie, courts in California have continued
to use the five step process laid out in Reber. In People v.
Nandkeshwar,"° the defendant was charged with, among oth-
er crimes, rape."' The victim was born with Down's Syn-
drome." On appeal, the defendant asserted that the refusal
to release the victim's medical and psychotherapy records was
reversible error."' The defendant requested that the trial
court review the medical and psychotherapy records in camera
to determine whether there was any evidence relevant to the
victim's competency to testify, and whether there was any medi-
cal information that might help explain other physical evidence.
The trial court agreed to review the medical records, but re-
fused to review the psychotherapy records. Defense counsel
later requested that the medical records be examined by
defendant's own medical experts. The trial court refused.
Relying on Reber, the court held that review of the psycho-
therapy records to determine whether they contained relevant
materials was essential to vindicate the defendant's constitu-
tional rights. Citing Ritchie, the court held that the "trial court
was to determine whether the records contained relevant and
material information, that is 'information that probably would
have changed the outcome.""' The court, however, then re-
viewed the psychotherapy records and found they did not "con-
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 41 (Ct. App. 1995); see also People v. Boyette, 247 Cal. Rptr.
795 (Ct. App. 1988); People v. Caplan, 238 Cal. Rptr. 478 (Ct. App. 1987).
111. Nandkeshwar, 38 Cal. Rptr.2d at 41.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 49 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 (1987)).
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tain information that probably would have changed the outcome
of the trial.""5 Finally, the court turned to the argument that
records of people voluntarily or involuntarily committed for
mental health reasons were protected from disclosure under the
California Welfare and Institutions Code."' Here, the court
held that the Welfare Code, which protected the mentally disor-
dered and the developmentally disabled, was indistinguishable
from the CWS records in Ritchie; therefore the trial court was
required to conduct a "Reber-type review. ""
5. Good Cause Standard
Ritchie and the California line of cases indicate that some
preliminary showing must be made by the defendant before an
in camera inspection is required. What must the defendant
establish to trigger such a review? People v. Pack' describes
the standard to be used by the court for determining whether
good cause exists. Here, the court held that the defendant's
request "must describe the requested information with reason-
able specificity and must be sustained by plausible justification
for production of the items requested.""
115. Id. (footnote omitted).
116. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5328 (Deering 1995).
117. Nandkeshwar, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
118. 240 Cal. Rptr. 2d 367 (Ct. App. 1987).
119. Id. at 370 (citation omitted); see also People v. Boyette, 247 Cal. Rptr. 795
(Ct. App. 1988) (stating that records must describe with specificity and make plausi-
ble showing the information is relevant); People v. McMillan, 607 N.E.2d 585 (Il1. Ct.
App. 1993) (holding that a showing that records are material and relevant is suffi-
cient); Zaal v. State, 602 A.2d 1247 (Md. Ct. App. 1992) (demanding a showing that
records likely contain relevant information); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 617 N.E.2d 990
(Mass. 1993) (stating that records must be likely to contain relevant evidence); State
v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68 (Min. 1992) (requiring that a plausible showing that
there will be material information); State v. Gagne, 612 A.2d 899 (N.H. 1992) (stating
that records must show reasonable probability of material and relevant evidence);
State v. Kalakosky, 852 P.2d 1064 (Wash. 1993) (stating that more than demand of
records is required-motion and supporting affidavit giving specific reasons why the
information should be revealed must be provided); State v. S.H., 465 N.W.2d 238
(Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (demanding a showing that records contain relevant information).
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6. Defense Counsel Inspection
In Ritchie the Court held that the in camera inspection was
to be conducted by the trial court. Under what circumstances, if
any, may defense counsel participate in the inspection? A clear
majority of courts utilize a system in which the defense only
has access to the records if the court first determines that they
are material. In other words, although most courts might recog-
nize "that defense counsel is generally in a better position than
the trial judge to make a determination of what may or may
not be useful to the defense,"'20 they still will not allow
counsel to participate.12' Exceptions have been made,
though. 122
7. When the Privilege is Absolute
If Pennsylvania's privilege was not absolute because of a
public policy that the privilege should defer to a higher com-
peting public policy, are there other circumstances where com-
parable evidence exists? For example, does the existence of a
statutory privilege versus a common law privilege evidence a
stronger public policy? Perhaps not surprisingly, following
Ritchie, steps were taken to increase the protection afforded sex
abuse victims by creating statutory privileges that were abso-
lute. The obvious hope here, was that the Supreme Court's
express statement that it was not addressing such a statute
indicated that this kind of privilege would be completely sacro-
sanct. Pennsylvania itself modified the CWS statute to make
the privilege absolute.'23
120. E.g., State v. Ramos, 858 P.2d 94, 98 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (citing State v.
Romero, 532 P.2d 208, 211 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975)).
121. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bishop, 617 N.E.2d 990 (Mass. 1993); State v.
Ramos, 858 P.2d 94, 97 (N.M. 1993).
122. See, e.g., State v. Allman, 352 S.E.2d 116, 120 (W. Va. 1986) (providing that
victim's psychiatric records be made available to defendants counsel); People v. Dace,
449 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983) (holding, before Ritchie, that defendant
should be able to discover victim's mental health history); People v. McMillan, 607
N.E.2d 585, 600 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the trial court did not commit re-
versible error in denying production of victim's psychiatric report).
123. See supra note 64.
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Even in cases dealing with an absolute privilege, however,
some courts have recognized that in certain circumstances an in
camera inspection might be required. Perhaps the leading case
addressing the distinction between absolute privilege and excep-
tions to the privilege is People v. Foggy.' 4 In Foggy, the de-
fendant was charged with criminal sexual assault and unlawful
restraint.' As a result of the assault, the victim received
treatment from a rape/sexual assault counseling program. 6
During pretrial discovery, defense counsel sought production of
"all records, reports, notes, memoranda, statements, oral, re-
corded, or written, and any and all other documents concerning
the alleged assault in the victim." 7 The trial court quashed
the subpoena with regard to the rape counseling, holding that
the communications between the counselor and the victim were
privileged under the Illinois statute. 8
The Illinois Supreme Court first pointed out that the Illinois
privilege "is unqualified, and we are therefore met with an
issue unresolved by Ritchie: whether an absolute privilege must
yield to a criminal defendant's pretrial discovery request for
otherwise privileged information that may provide material for
use in cross-examining witnesses." 9 In upholding the trial
court's refusal to conduct an in camera review of the docu-
ments, the court made several points. First, the stated purpose
of the statute was to encourage victims to receive treatment
and to assist police in preventing future crimes. Second, the
predecessor statute was a qualified privilege that specifically
allowed in camera inspection; the legislature intentionally
strengthened the newer statute by making it absolute. Third,
the role of the rape crisis counselor is "to help the victim un-
derstand and resolve her feelings" and not to assist the investi-
gation of the crime. 3 ' The court went on to add:
124. 521 N.E.2d 86 (IM. 1988).
125. Id. at 87.
126. Id. at 88.
127. Id.
128. Id. The Illinois statute provides in relevant part: "No rape crisis counselor
shall disclose any confidential communication or be examined as a witness in any
civil or criminal proceeding as to any confidential communication without the consent
of the victim." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-802.1(c) (1985).
129. Foggy, 521 N.E.2d at 91.
130. Id.
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It is important to note that in this case the defendant's
request for an in camera inspection of the counseling re-
cords was merely general; he did not allege that informa-
tion may exist in the counseling files that would be subject
to disclosure. Moreover, the defendant had access to the
array of unprivileged statements made by the complaining
witness to other persons following the commission of the
offenses, including ... nearly contemporaneous state-
ments.'31
Finally, using language that would appear to indicate that what
was functionally missing was the good cause showing required
by Ritchie and cases such as Reber, the court stated: 'Because
of the strong policy of confidentiality ... and the absence of
any indication by the defendant that the victim's communica-
tions with the counselor would provide a source of impeach-
ment, we do not believe that the privilege was required to be
breached in this case."3 2 Indeed the court, in summary, dis-
tinguished Davis v. Alaska'33 on the basis that the defendant
in Davis was able to point to specific information and had no
other means of access to the information." This interpreta-
tion was subsequently followed by People v. Foskey,"3' in
which the court held that the defendant was entitled to an in
camera inspection of confidential communications between a
rape crisis counselor and the victim. The court distinguished
Foggy on the basis that, in Foskey, "the defendant was aware of
specific information that had the potential to demonstrate the
witness' bias and motive to falsify her testimony. "
136
At least two courts, however, have rigidly held that in the
face of an absolute privilege, a defendant is not entitled to an
in camera inspection. In Pennsylvania v. Wilson,'3' the court
was confronted with the scope of a sexual assault counselor's
privilege. Having determined that the statutory privilege was
131. Id.
132. Id. at 92.
133. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
134. Foggy, 521 N.E.2d at 92.
135. 554 N.E.2d 192 (Ill. 1990).
136. Id. at 205.
137. 602 A.2d 1290 (Pa. 1992).
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absolute, the court turned to the question of whether the privi-
lege denied the defendant his constitutional rights. Relying on
Ritchie, the court stated that the right to confrontation only
requires wide latitude to question witnesses, and went on to
say that no disclosure was permissible because of the absolute
nature of the privilege. 3 ' The holding in Colorado in People v.
District Court was similar.
139
8. Determining Whether the Privilege is Absolute
In light of an absolute privilege, is there a constitutional
requirement to allow some type of disclosure?
In a jurisdiction like Pennsylvania, determining whether a
privilege is absolute can be of critical importance. For statutory
privileges, the determination should usually be a simple matter
of statutory interpretation. In addition, a number of courts that
have addressed the issue make a distinction between statutory
privileges that by their terms are absolute, and common law
privileges that by the nature of their judicial development are
not absolute. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Wilson'44  distinguished that case from Commonwealth v.
Lloyd."" In Lloyd, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
We now hold under the Confrontation Clause of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution, that [the defendant] was denied his
right to confrontation when his attorney was denied access
to the contents of the victim's psychotherapeutic records. In
addition we hold that the right to inspect these records is
also mandated by the Compulsory Process Clause of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.'
138. Id. at 1296; see also Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 604 A.2d 1036 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992) (holding that the statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege is absolute and
therefore no in camera inspection was allowed).
139. 719 P.2d 722, 727 (Colo. 1986).
140. 602 A.2d 1290 (Pa. 1992).
141. 567 A.2d 1357 (Pa. 1989).
142. Id. at 1359; see also Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 604 A.2d 1036 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992) (stating that the statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege is absolute
where the records are not in the possession of the prosecution, and therefore no in
camera inspection was allowed).
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The court in Wilson, however, stated that "Lloyd was concerned
with a common law privilege which could not defeat a
defendant's constitutional rights. Implicit in the distinction
drawn by the Lloyd court is the recognition that ... the legis-
lature acknowledges the significance of a particular interest and
has chosen to protect that interest."' Assuming that the ju-
risdiction rejects the narrow Pennsylvania approach and follows
what is apparently the majority view represented by the
Ritchie-Reber-Foggy cases, the ability of a defendant to show
good cause in order to trigger an in camera inspection in a
criminal action where the victim alleges he or she has recov-
ered memory during some type of therapy had been strength-
ened.
9. Exceptions to Privilege
a. No Privilege Applies
Perhaps the easiest way to justify access to the records is to
examine jurisdictions in which there is no privilege. At least
three federal circuits have specifically refused to recognize the
privilege.'"
Sexual abuse cases are an exception to some therapist-patient
privileges. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' for example,
recently held that a psychotherapist-patient privilege did not
apply to criminal child sexual abuse cases. Statutory privileges
themselves may also contain -explicit exceptions. In State v.
Kalakosky,"' a case involving charges of rape, the Supreme
143. Wilson, 602 A.2d at 1290, 1297-98; see generally State v. Ramos, 858 P.2d 94
(N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Wilson's interpretation of Lloyd with apparent approval,
in a case where it approved a process by which records were denied, but after an in
camera inspection).
144. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d
752 (5th Cir. 1976).
145. United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1994). Although Burtrum
involved the discovery of the defendant's therapy records, its rejection of a major
underlying rationale of the privilege, that of encouraging treatment, is equally appli-
cable to victims as well.
146. 852 P.2d 1064 (Wash. 1993).
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Court of Washington pointed out that the rape crisis counselor
privilege in that state explicitly recognizes in camera inspection
and states the conditions for possible discovery.'
In addition to explicit exceptions to the privilege, some courts
have held that implicit in statutes designed to encourage child
abuse reporting and investigation is an exception as well. In
State v. Hansen,"~ the defendant, a high school teacher, was
charged with sodomy of a sixteen-year-old student. Defense
counsel sought to introduce evidence of communication between
the plaintiff and her private psychologist concerning the
student's relationship with the defendant. The Oregon psycho-
therapist-patient statutory privilege contained an exception that
provided "[i]n the case of abuse of a child . .. the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege.. . shall not be a ground for excluding
evidence regarding a child's abuse, or the cause thereof, in any
judicial proceeding resulting from a report made pursuant to
ORS 418.750." 49 Rejecting the state's argument that the
legislation's purpose was to apply only to evidence that could
prove guilt, not evidence that would exculpate the accused, the
Oregon Supreme Court stated:
[T]he legislature intended to make a limited exception to
the psychotherapist-patient privilege in order to assist in a
search for the truth regarding an instance of possible child
abuse, not in order to prove a particular result. The state
has pointed to nothing, and we have been unable to find
anything, in the legislative history of the child abuse re-
porting laws from which we could infer that in addition to
facilitating proof of child abuse the legislature intended to
limit the exception so as to prevent a person accused of
abuse from introducing exculpatory evidence.15
The exception to the privilege may actually exist separate
from the privilege statute. For example, a similar result to that
in Hansen was reached in Jett v. State,5' where the Florida
147. Id. at 1074 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 70.125.065 (1992)).
148. 743 P.2d 157 (Or. 1987).
149. OR. REv. STAT. § 418.775(1) (1983).
150. Hansen, 743 P.2d at 163.
151. 605 So. 2d 926, 928 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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district court of appeal held that the child sex abuse reporting
statute required any person, including psychotherapists, to
report suspected child abuse.152 This requirement, the court
held, constituted a waiver of the privilege. Having held that the
privilege was waived by the reporting statute, the court held
that the information was available not only to the state, but to
the accused as well.
The general criminal discovery statutes may also constitute
an exception to the privilege. In Spencer v. State,53 the Alas-
ka Court of Appeals required an in camera inspection of evi-
dence to determine whether it was relevant. In so holding, the
court relied upon the general discovery provisions of the Alaska
Rules of Criminal Procedure:
In order to provide adequate information for informed pleas,
expedite trial, minimize surprise, afford opportunity for
effective cross-examination, and meet the requirements of
due process, discovery prior to trial should be as full and
free as possible consistent with protection of persons, effec-
tive law enforcement, and the adversary system.54
Non-disclosure, the court held, was only permissible when there
would be harm to people or law enforcement and the material
was not relevant to the defense.'55
It should also be kept in mind that a particular therapist
may not fall within the protection afforded by a specific privi-
lege. For example, in Hulett v. State,'56 the Indiana Court of
Appeals held that the statutory psychologist-patient privilege
did not apply to a counselor who was not a certified psycholo-
gist.
b. Refreshing Recollection: At Trial
Discovery of the psychotherapist-patient records may also be
possible using the evidentiary principles related to refreshing
152. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.504 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
153. 642 P.2d 1371 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
154. Id. at 1374 (citing ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(a)).
155. Id. at 1375.
156. 552 N.E.2d 47 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
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recollection, and by drawing an analogy to hypnotically re-
freshed memory. When a witness is on the stand and some-
thing, usually a document, is used to refresh that witness's
memory, opposing counsel has a right to inspect that item.'57
If the item used to refresh happens to be otherwise privileged
or constitutes work product, those protections are waived. What
is not so clear is whether documents used to refresh a witness's
memory prior to trial are discoverable and, if so, whether they
lose their protection.
The Federal Rules of Evidence clearly envision that the items
used prior to trial are discoverable, but not as a matter of
right. The rule specifically refers to the court's discretion to
allow disclosure.' 8 Also, certainly prior to passage of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence by Congress and by its counterparts in a
majority of states, the majority rule was that such
pretestimonial use did not constitute a waiver of the privilege
or of work-product." 9 The cases, however, are split.6 ° If, in
a jurisdiction that allows waiver, a clear argument can be made
that recovered memory is the result of a refreshment process,
then the items used to refresh the witness's memory, whether
they are documents, communications between psychotherapist
and patient, or other tangible items, should be open to inspec-
tion.
c. Refreshing Recollection: Pre-trial Hypnosis of Witnesses
The prevalence of pre-testimonial hypnosis has generated
considerable litigation. Since as far back as 1974, for example,
courts have held that testimony given in court by a witness
157. FED. R. EviD. 612.
158. Id.
159. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE §§ 6.23-.26
(1995).
160. See also Deijerian v. Polaroid Corp., 121 F.R.D. 13 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1988)
(questioning whether the rulings of the Berkey Photo and Wheeling-Pittsburgh courts
are in accord with Congressional intent). Compare Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v.
Underwriters Labs, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 8 (N.D. IlM. 1978) (work product waived) with
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (work prod-
uct not waived).
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under hypnosis is inadmissible. 161 A different issue, however,
is whether a witness who has been subjected to hypnosis may
subsequently testify at trial. The United States Supreme Court
has noted that, even though a per se rule excluding hypnotical-
ly refreshed testimony is unconstitutional, there are significant
dangers to such testimony. 162 Individual states have taken
very different approaches. Some jurisdictions exclude the hyp-
notically refreshed testimony as scientifically unreliable."
The opposite result has also occurred, with some courts holding
that the fact that the testimony was hypnotically refreshed goes
to credibility."6 A number of courts appear to leave the deci-
sion to the court's discretion. For example, the Virginia Su-
preme Court in Hopkins v. Commonwealth6 1 stated that "[i]n
determining the competency of a previously hypnotized witness,
a trial court should review the circumstances surrounding any
hypnosis session. The court should consider any evidence of
suggestion and should compare the subject's prior statements
with those made after hypnosis."66 Because the witness in
Hopkins testified that the post-hypnotic testimony concerned
only matters that the witness remembered before hypnosis, the
witness was allowed to testify.
Some courts allow testimony if certain procedures have been
followed. In State v. Hurd,17 the Supreme Court of New Jer-
sey, established the following procedures:
m a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in the use of
hypnosis should conduct the session;
m the person conducting the session should be independent of
and not regularly employed by the prosecutor, investigator or
defense;
information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement
personnel or the defense prior to the hypnotic session should be
recorded;
161. Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 414, 418-19 (Va. 1974).
162. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
163. See, e.g., State v. Marin, 684 P.2d 651 (Wash. 1984).
164. See, e.g., State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756 (La. 1983).
165. 337 S.E.2d 264 (Va. 1985).
166. Id. at 271.
167. 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981).
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a before hypnosis the professional should obtain a detailed
description by asking structured questions or adding new de-
tails;
n the professional should avoid influencing the description by
asking structured questions or adding new details;
- all contacts between the professional and the witness
should be recorded;
" the use of videotape is strongly encouraged;
" only the professional and the subject should be present
during the sessions, including the pre-hypnotic testing and post-
hypnotic interview. 6 '
The risks associated with hypnotically refreshed testimony
are strikingly similar, indeed, to the extent that hypnosis is
used to recover memory, they are identical to the dangers of
recovered memory. As stated by the United States Supreme
Court in Rock v. Arkansas:
5 9
The popular belief that hypnosis guarantees the accuracy of
recall is as yet without established foundation and, in fact,
hypnosis often has no effect at all on memory. The most
common response to hypnosis, however, appears to an in-
crease in both correct and incorrect recollections. Three
general characteristics of hypnosis may lead to the introduc-
tion of inaccurate memories: the subject becomes "suggest-
ible" and may try to please the hypnotist with answers the
subject thinks will be met with approval; the subject is
likely to "confabulate," that is, to fill in details from the
imagination in order to make an answer more coherent and
complete; and, the subject experiences "memory hardening,"
which gives him or her great confidence in both true and
false memories, making effective cross-examination more
difficult. 70
168. Id. at 96-97.
169. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
170. Id. at 59-60 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added) (citing Martin T. Orne et
al., Hypnotically Induced Testimony, reprinted in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL PERSPECTIVES 171 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984); Bernard L.
Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness,
68 CAL. L. REv. 313, 333-42 (1980)).
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With these caveats about suggestibility, confabulation, and
the malleability of memory, how then can experts effectively
evaluate the clinical record in cases where repressed recollec-
tions of past sexual abuse are at issue?
II. EVALUATING THE PSYCHOTHERAPY RECORD
A. Effective Psychotherapy: What It Is
We believe that even when a person's difficulties in living are
largely a function of biological aberrations (e.g., schizophrenia,
major depression, bipolar disorder (manic-depression)), effective
psychotherapy:
(1) Does not pathologize or conceptualize patients as diseased,
and instead reflects a collaborative relationship with a therapist
that helps one "make sense of' his or her gallant attempt to
adapt to previous life experiences as well as their genetic
"hardware";' 7 1
(2) Teaches people new ways to construe past, current, and
future experiences, so they can live a richer, more rewarding,
and effective life; 172
(3) Helps patients learn new thought patterns, behaviors,
ways to appropriately regulate emotional expression, and re-
sponses to changes in relationships or predictable life transi-
tions (e.g., birth of a child, death of a parent) based on well-
developed theory supported by empirical data;. 3
171. One of the most widely held notions in the past 15 years has been the con-
cept of co-dependency, where one gets labeled as mentally ill or diseased because of
one's relationship with an addicted person. The theory of co-dependency represents
the first time in psychiatric history where one could be diagnosed primarily on the
basis of another person's behavior. In our experience, many times in repressed memo-
ry cases, the patient has been labeled co-dependent and encouraged to rise above this
condition, break an interactional pattern that supposedly maintains the diseased
person's behavior, and often confront the addict or abuser with the consequences of
his or her behavior.
172. GEORGE A. KELLY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONAL CONSTRUCTS (1955).
173. See AARON T. BECK ET AL., ANXIETY DISORDERS AND PHOBIAS: A COGNITIVE
PERSPECTIVE (1985) (hereinafter ANXIETY DISORDERS AND PHOBIAS); AARON T. BECK
ET AL., COGNITIVE THERAPY OF DEPRESSION (1979) (hereinafter THERAPY OF DEPRES-
SION); AARON T. BECK & ARTHUR FREEMAN, COGNITIVE THERAPY OF PERSONALITY DIS-
ORDERS (1990) (hereinafter THERAPY OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS); BENJAMIN, supra
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(4) Accomplishes these objectives in the context of an empath-
ic and genuinely caring relationship with the therapist."
B. Effective Psychotherapy: What It Is Not
In addition to psychotherapeutic interventions that are nei-
ther driven by well-developed theory or scientific data, we are
seriously skeptical of treatment providers who approach their
work from a decidedly political standpoint. While the personal
may be political, as some feminists have argued, 75 we have
yet to see family pain or trauma fully salved by litigation. In-
deed, we view with considerable skepticism advice by either
self-proclaimed experts or licensed treatment providers who
encourage patients to sue alleged abusers on the basis of mem-
ories recovered in therapy, especially recollections unearthed
using the psychic "tool kit" of techniques described below. Fur-
thermore, we wonder whether the adversarial legal process can
increase the probability of an accuser feeling re-abused rather
than cleansed and vindicated.
Additionally, we want to underscore our principal concern
over the use of so-called therapeutic techniques that have not
been tested by scientific research (or explained a priori as ex-
perimental to the client); techniques that can create
pseudomemories of abuse, fuel unsubstantiated accusations of
molestation, and consequently destroy the lives and families of
innocent people. These caveats emphasize our position that the
documented record of psychotherapy must be evaluated by ex-
perts who have a sophisticated understanding of mental health
treatment.
note 71; DANIEL J. LEVINSON ET AL., THE SEASONS OF A WOMAN'S LIFE (1995), DAN-
IEL J. LEVINSON ET AL., THE SEASONS OF A MAN'S LIFE (1978); MARSHA M. LINEHAN,
COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT OF BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER (1993);
DONALD MEICHENBAUM, A CLINICAL HANDBOOK/PRACTICAL THERAPIST MANUAL FOR AS-
SESSING AND TREATING ADULTS WITH POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER (1994).
174. Rogers, supra note 81.
175. See generally LAURA S. BROWN, SUBVERSIVE DIALOGUES: THEORY IN FEMINIST
THERAPY (1994); FEMINIST THERAPY INSTITUTE, FEMINIST THERAPY CODE OF ETHICS
(1987); LENORE E. WALKER, ABUSED WOMEN AND SURVIVOR THERAPY (1994).
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C. Expert Witnesses to Evaluate Treatment
In this regard, we believe the clinical record needs extremely
careful analysis by expert clinicians well-schooled in and sophis-
ticated about the art, science, and complexity of psychotherapy.
Other professionals, for instance experts in cognitive processes
(e.g., memory, suggestibility, etc.) or social psychology (e.g.,
interpersonal influence, coercion, and small group processes),
should also be afforded access to these records. This might,
under certain circumstances, be done in conjunction with a
clinician who could help interpret certain interventions that
might be iatrogenic 75  or inconsistent with the empirical
knowledge base in psychology. Note however that, in our view,
advanced degrees per se are not enough, because even doctoral
level professionals sometimes hold dangerous and ill-founded
beliefs, 7 practice in ways that have no theoretical or empiri-
cal support in the scientific literature, 7 ' and may not fully
appreciate the interpersonal dynamics of persuasion, suggest-
ibility, and iatrogenesis.'79 Thus, we believe that the following
protocol could be helpful in keeping clinical experts focused on
relevant material in the record.
D. Proposed Evaluation Protocol
1. Standard of Care
Awareness of the evolving standard of care in clinical
recordkeeping is important because only recently has at least
one group of treatment providers (psychologists) developed a
176. Iatrogenic is defined as " . . . caused by the diagnosis, manner, or treatment
of a physician." RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 946 (2d ed. 1993).
177. YAPKO, supra note 4; see also Poole et al., supra note 12.
178. ROBIN M. DAWES, HOUSE OF CARDS: PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY BUILT
ON MYTH (1994).
179. For a discussion of iatrogenesis and psychiatric diagnosis, with special refer-
ence to DID or Multiple Personality Disorder, see OFSHE & WATTERS, supra note 4;
PENDERGRAST, supra note 4; Thomas A. Fahy, The Diagnosis of Multiple Personality
Disorder, 153 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 597 (1988); Harold Mersky, The Manufacture of
Personalities: The Production of Multiple Personality Disorder, 160 BRIT. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 327 (1992); Nick Spanos, Multiple Identity Enactments and Multiple Personality
Disorder: A Sociocognitive Perspective, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 143 (1994).
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formal set of documentation guidelines.' In years past, de-
spite counsel from numerous authorities, 8' the standard in
the field has varied widely, perhaps being a 'nonstandard' of
sorts. As recently as five years ago, sixty-six percent of a ran-
dom sample of 300 licensed doctoral level psychologist-psycho-
therapists admitted failing to keep information in the treatment
record that could afford them a minimal amount of legal protec-
tion.'82 When reviewing treatment records, the careful and fair
clinical record evaluator keeps in mind the extent to which the
practitioner's overall behavior-including recordkeeping-con-
formed to the minimal standard of care extant at the time of
treatment. With regard to documentation of psychotherapy, in
practical terms, this means that with the advent in the last few
years of managed mental health care and third-party payers'
demands for explicit treatment plans and outcome measure-
ment, one would hope to see a record of care that finally bears
180. American Psychological Association Committee on Professional Practice and
Standards, Record Keeping Guidelines, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 984 (1993), reprinted in
SHARON L. YENNEY, BUSINESS STRATEGIES FOR A CARING PROFESSION: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDEBOOK (1994).
181. See generally RONALD J. COHEN & WILLIAM E. MARIANO, LEGAL GUIDEBOOK
IN MENTAL HEALTH (1982); RONALD J. COHEN, MALPRACTICE: A GUIDE FOR MENTAL
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (1979); CLIFFORD D. STROMBERG ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGISTS
LEGAL HANDBOOK (1987); ROBERT H. WOODY, FIFTY WAYS TO AVOID MALPRACTICE
(1988); Gary W. Buttone, Understanding and Managing the Litigious Patient, 9 PSY-
CHOTHERAPY IN PRIVATE PRAC. 27 (1991); Donald J. Dawidoff, Some Suggestions to
Psychiatrists for Avoiding Legal Jeopardy, 29 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 699
(1973); Thomas G. Gutheil, Paranoia and Progress Notes: A Guide for Forensically In-
formed Psychiatric Recordkeeping, 31 Hosp. & COmmuNrIY PSYCHIATRY 479 (1980);
Dennis J. Horan & Robert J. Milligan, Recent Developments in Psychiatric Mal-
practice, 1 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 23 (1983); R. Slovenko, On the Need for
Recordkeeping in the Practice of Psychiatry, 7 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 339 (1979); Paul D.
Snider, Client Records: Inexpensive Liability Protection for Mental Health Counselors, 9
J. MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING 134 (1987); Ellen L. Soisson et al., Thorough
Recordkeeping: A Good Defense in a Litigious Era, 18 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC.
498 (1987); S. Watkins & J.C. Watkins, Malpractice in Clinical Social Work: a
Perspective on Civil Liability in the 1980s, 1 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 55 (1983).
182. See generally John R. Paddock et al., Recordkeeping Practices of Psychologist-
Psychotherapists: Part I, Empirical Findings and Implications for Clinical Practice, 42
GA. PSYCHOL. 24 (1989); see also Carole Siegel & Susan K. Fischer, A National
Questionnaire Survey of Mental Health Professionals on their use of and Attitudes
Toward Psychiatric Records, in PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE (C.
Siegel & S.K. Fischer eds., 1981); Solomon M. Fulero & Jeffrey R. Wilbert,
Recordkeeping Practices of Clinical and Counseling Psychologists: A Survey of Practi-
tioners, 19 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. AND PRAC. 658 (1988).
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some resemblance to the suggestions articulated by experts over
the past fifteen years.
2. Record Content
The expert should examine thoroughly the organization and
content of the clinical record. In addition to the demographic
data that common sense dictates be included on a "face
sheet,"' and developmental and psychosocial history and
clear description of presenting problem(s)," we recommend
examining the following five areas:
(1) Has a diagnosis been made consistent with criteria pub-
lished in the DSM in use at the time of service?
8 5
(2) Have the presenting symptoms been evaluated by methods
other than clinical intuition or observation? That is, did the
practitioner conduct a formal Mental Status Evaluation (a tech-
nique questionable from a psychometric standpoint but never-
theless quite common in clinical psychiatry)? 6 Did the practi-
tioner use semi-structured rather than free-ranging diagnostic
interviews to elucidate and describe symptoms?8 7 Finally, did
the practitioner administer scientifically developed, normed,
validated, reliable, and objective measures of symptoms or in-
terpersonal behavior patterns?
183. E.g., name, address, sex, marital status, date of birth, school/employer, emer-
gency contact numbers, next of kin, and insurance carrier/policy number.
184. See WOODY, supra note 181.
185. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994).
186. See R.A. Mackinnon & Stuart C. Yudofsky, Outline of the Psychiatric History
and Mental Status Examination, in TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY (John A. Talbott et al.,
eds., 1988).
187. RICHARD ROGERS, DIAGNOSTIC AND STRUCTURED INTERVIEWING: A HANDBOOK
FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS (1995).
188. See, e.g., AARON T. BECK & ROBERT A. STEER, BECK ANXIETY INVENTORY:
MANUAL (1993a); AARON T. BECK & ROBERT A. STEER, BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY:
MANUAL (1993b); AARON T. BECK & ROBERT A. STEER, BECK HOPELESSNESS INVEN-
TORY: MANUAL (1993c); AARON T. BECK & ROBERT A. STEER, BECK SCALE FOR SUI-
CIDE IDEATION: MANUAL (1991); JAMES N. BUTCHER ET AL., MINNESOTA MULTIPHASIC
PERSONALITY INVENTORY-2 (MMPI-2): MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATION AND SCORING
(1989); CATrELL ET AL., THE 16 PF (5th ed. 1994); LEONARD R. DEROGATIS, BSI,
BRIEF SYMPTOM INVENTORY: ADMINISTRATION, SCORING, AND PROCEDURES MANUAL
(1993); LEONARD R. DEROGATIS, SCL-90-R: ADMINISTRATION, SCORING, AND PROCE-
DURES MANUAL (1993); 1 & 2 JOEL FISCHER & KEVIN CORCORAN, MEASURES FOR
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(3) Has a formal treatment plan been developed that not only
focuses on the presenting and evaluated symptoms, but also is
driven by a clearly stated theoretical rationale, and schedules
periodic assessment of symptomatology to evaluate efficacy of
interventions?89
(4) Has the theoretical rationale underlying treatment been
successfully subject to challenge in the empirical psychological
literature? For instance, in our experience some practitioners
appear to cling rigidly to Freudian concepts of repression, de-
spite the lack of empirical evidence supporting the phenome-
non,19 instead of re-orienting their thinking to modern, scien-
tifically developed, and empirically supported theoretical concep-
tualizations. 9
CLINICAL PRACTICE: A SOURCEBOOK (2nd ed. 1994); T. MILLON, MOMI-IIl: MANUAL
(1994).
189. See generally DAVID H. BARLOw ET AL., THE SCIENTIST-PRACTITIONER: RE-
SEARCH AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN CLINICAL AND EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS (1994); MARTIN
BLOOM & JOEL FISCHER, EVALUATING PRACTICE (1982).
190. See HOLMES, supra note 9.
191. See, e.g. Lorna S. Benjamin, Use of the SASB Dimensional Model to Develop
Treatment Plans for Personality Disorders: L Narcissism. 1 J. PERSONALITY DISORDERS
43 (1987); Lorna S. Benjamin, Brief SASB-Directed Reconstructive Learning Therapy,
PAUL CRITS-CHRISTOPH & JEFFREY P. BARBER, HANDBOOK OF SHORT-TERM DYNAMIC
PSYCHOTHERAPY (1991); BENJAMIN, supra note 71 (all discussing interpersonal psycho-
therapy).
For a discussion of cognitive-behavioral treatment of depression, anxiety, and
personality disorders see DAVID H. BARLOw, ANXIETY AND ITS DISORDERS (1988);
THERAPY OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS, supra note 173; ANxIETY DISORDERS AND PHO-
BIAS, supra note 173; THERAPY OF DEPRESSION, supra note 173; HANDBOOK OF CLINI-
CAL BEHAVIOR THERAPY (Samuel M. Turner et al. eds., 2d ed. 1992).
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(5) Does the prescribed treatment have documented efficacy
in the scientific literature?'92 If not, did the therapist obtain
informed consent for the treatment protocol?
3. Iatrogenic Interventions
In our judgement, the most important data in the record of
repressed memory cases are evidence of suggestive techniques
that are potentially iatrogenic and likely to lead a patient to
develop false memories of sexual abuse trauma. These fall in
192. While not exhaustive, the following are lists of empirically documented
treatments for many of the kinds of symptom patterns initially presented in re-
pressed memory cases:
For treatment of depression see THERAPY OF DEPRESSION supra note 173;
Alberto DiMascio et al., Therapy of Depression, Differential Symptom Reduction by
Drugs and Psychotherapy in Acute Depression, 36 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY
1450 (1979); Keith S. Dobson, A Meta-Analysis of the Efficacy of Cognitive Therapy for
Depression, 57 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 414 (1989); Peter M. Lewinsohn
et al., The Coping with Depression Course, 21 CANADIAN J. BEHAVIOR SC. 470 (1989).
For treatment of anxiety disorders, see David H. Barlow et al., Behavioral
Treatment of Panic Disorder, 20 BEHAVIOR THERAPY 261 (1989); ANXIETY DISORDERS
AND PHOBIAS, supra note 173; Edna B. Foa et al., Treatment of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder in Rape Victims: A Comparison Between Cognitive-Behavioral Procedures and
Counseling, 59 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 715 (1991); Richard S.
Heimsberg et al., Cognitive Behavioral Group Treatment for Social Phobia: Compari-
son with a Credible Placebo Control, 14 COGNITIVE THERAPY AND RES. 1 (1990); Alan
E. Kazdin & Linda A. Wilcoxon, Systematic Desensitization and Nonspecific Treatment
Effects: A Methodological Evaluation, 83 PSYCHOL. BULL. 729 (1976); Isaac Marks &
Geraldine O'Sullivan, Drugs and Psychological Treatments for Agoraphobia/Panic and
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorders, 153 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 650 (1988); Richard P.
Mattick et al., Treatment of Panic and Agoraphobia, 178 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL
DISEASE 567 (1990); Richard P. Mattick & Lorna Peters, Treatment of Severe Social
Phobia: Effects of Guided Exposure With and Without Cognitive Restructuring, 56 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 251 (1988); Lars-G6ran Ost, Applied Relaxation vs.
Progressive Relaxation in the Treatment of Panic Disorder, 26 BEHAVIOR RES. & THER-
APY 13 (1988); Gary Steketee et al., Recent Advances in the Behavioral Treatment of
Obsessive-Compulsives, 39 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 1365 (1982); Timothy J.
Trull et al., The Use of Meta-Analysis to Assess the Clinical Significance of Behavior
Therapy for Agoraphobia, 19 BEHAVIOR THERAPY 527 (1988).
For treatment of eating disorders see Christopher G. Fairburn et al., Psycho-
therapy and Bulimia Nervosa: Longer-Term Effects of Interpersonal Psychotherapy,
Behavior Therapy, and Cognitive Behavior Therapy, 50 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY
419 (1993); Denise E. Wilfley et al., Group Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy and Group
Interpersonal Psychotherapy for the Nonpurging Bulimic Individual 61 J. CONSULTING
& CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 296 (1993).
For treatment of suicidality and Borderline Personality Disorder see LINEHAN,
supra note 173; Marsha M. Linehan et al., Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment of Chroni-
cally Parasuicidal Borderline Patients, 48 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1060 (1991).
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three general categories: self-help bibliotherapy; pseudo-medical
interventions; and shamanic rituals.
a. Self-Help Bibliotherapy
Our experience in these cases indicates that many therapists
recommend books to their patients containing information that
directly and explicitly contradicts established scientific data
about the reconstructive nature of memory. That is, they ap-
pear to assert the "Camcorder Model of memory" which as-
serts-quite without empirical substantiation-that the mind
records every experienced event, and through psychotherapeutic
techniques, memories may be unearthed with pristine clarity
and accuracy.193 These books convey very powerful and sug-
gestive messages to patients about the origins of their symp-
tomatology and utility in adopting the identity of a victim.
Some contain so-called checklists (with no reported scientific
reliability or validity), ostensibly to help people diagnose them-
selves as victims of sexual abuse.94 Others assert, once again
contrary to data reported in the literature,'95 that sexual
abuse survivors and perpetrators possess definite personality
characteristics and symptom patterns. Still other books fuel the
myth of organized alleged widespread satanic ritual abuse.'96
193. See Bass & Davis, supra note 20; JOHN BRADsHAW, BRADsHAw ON: THE FAMI-
LY (1992); J.E. BRADSHAw LEARS, INCEST: WHEN YOU WONDER IF IT HAPPENED TO
You 43 (1992); FREDRICKSON, supra note 11.
194. MELODY BEATTIE, CO-DEPENDENT No MORE 37 (1987); BLUME, supra note 11,
at xvii.
195. Utah v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989); Andrew Cohen, The Unreli-
ability of Expert Testimony on the Typical Characteristics of Sexual Abuse Victims, 74
GEO. L.J. 429 (1985); Kathleen A. Kendall-Tacket et aL, Impact of Sexual Abuse on
Children: A Review and Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL.
164 (1993); David McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complainants
in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological
Evidence, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1986); John E.B. Myers et al., Expert
Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1989); Melissa A.
Polusny & Victoria M. Follette, Long-Term Correlates of Child Sexual Abuse: Theory
and Review of the Empirical Literature, 4 APPLIED & PREVENTATIVE PSYCHOL. 143
(1995); David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Ap-
proach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cas-
es, 66 OR. L. REV. 19 (1987).
196. For excellent discussions of this phenomenon, see OFSHE & WATrERS, supra
note 4; PENDERGRAST, supra note 4.
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b. Pseudo-Medical Interventions
Frequently in these records one finds reference to the use of
hypnosis and/or a sodium amytal interview to help a patient
unlock the mental gates of repression and thereby liberate
memories from her psychic straight jacket. Again, both the
courts (per Rock v. Arkansas)197 and well-trained clinicians
know of the inherent unreliability of "memories" reported under
hypnosis, 98 and have heeded the warning issued over 10
years ago by the Council on Scientific Affairs of the American
Medical Association: "Contrary to what is generally believed by
the public, recollections obtained during hypnosis not only fail
to be more accurate but actually appear to be generally less
reliable than.., recall [when the patient is not hypno-
tized]."'99 Similarly, interviewing patients following a sodium
amytal ("truth serum") injection in fact does not increase memo-
ry reliability, but creates a situation ripe for confabulation and
distortion,"' and in one case has led to a successful malprac-
tice action against a psychiatrist.2"'
c. Shamanic Rituals
Finally, an overview of clinical records indicate a plethora of
unvalidated, potentially suggestible and downright harmful
techniques used by therapists when going on these kind of well-
intended but misguided psycho-archeological digs: guided imag-
ery; dream interpretation; journal writing; "body work"; art
therapy, and other specious interventions such as "aroma thera-
py. 2 02 In each case, these interventions could readily lead a
197. 483 U.S. 44 (1987); see supra notes 162, 168-69 and accompanying text.
198. Peter W. Sheehan et al., Pseudomemory Effects and Their Relationship to
Level of Susceptibility to Hypnosis and State Instruction, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 130 (1991).
199. Council on Scientific Affairs, Scientific Status of Refreshing Recollection by the
Use of Hypnosis, 253 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1918, 1923 (1985).
200. August Piper Jr., "Truth Serum" and 'Recovered Memories'-of Sexual Abuse: A
Review of the Evidence, 21 J. of PSYCHIATRY & L. 447 (1993).
201. Elizabeth Loftus, Therapeutic Recollection of Childhood Abuse: When a Memory
May Not be a Memory, THE CHAMPION 5-10.
202. See LOFTUS & KETCHAM, supra note 1; WALKER, supra note 175; Lindsay &
Read, supra note 4.
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highly suggestible person to develop beliefs that are just not
true. Particularly dangerous, we believe, are interventions such
as certain group therapies in which potentially suggestible
patients are subjected to an interpersonal process that socially
reinforces misinformation about the nature of memory storage
and recall.0 3 While group therapy is not intrinsically an inap-
propriate intervention for genuine survivors of sexual abuse, if
the leaders are unschooled in the scientific data on memory,
patients could in effect find themselves victimized by the treat-
ment, perhaps having acquiesced to a group norm and social-
ization process developed via techniques that foster disinforma-
tion about the undoubted and unchallenged legitimacy of recol-
lections allegedly buried under layers of repression prior to
psychotherapeutic excavation.
III. CONCLUSION
We believe that persons accused of crimes recalled by wit-
nesses or victims only after a prolonged period of alleged re-
pression have a special status. Because plaintiffs invoke the
mental state of repression -- a process that we have argued
has virtually no support in the scientific literature-one effec-
tive defense could be that the recent recollections were a prod-
uct of suggestion within or outside of psychotherapy. Strong
support for that defense would necessitate detailed information
about treatment including, but not limited to, the therapist's
theoretical viewpoint, knowledge of the relevant empirical liter-
ature in psychopathology, cognitive and social psychology, and
methodology for diagnosing nervous and mental disorders. Most
critical, we believe, is an understanding of the ways suggestion
and interpersonal influence can be and have been abused in
psychotherapy.
203. Compare Judith L. Herman & Emily Schatzow, Recovery and Verification of
Memories of Childhood Sexual Trauma, 4 PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOL. 1 (1987) with
Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Forgetting Sexual Trauma: What Does it Mean When 38%
Forget?, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1177 (1994) and Pope & Hudson,
supra note 4 at 121-26.
204. Terms such as dissociation or psychogenic amnesia are also used to describe
similar phenomena.
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Because much of the discussion in therapy might involve
irrelevant matters, sometimes of a highly personal nature,
witnesses or victims in these cases need to be protected from
undue invasion of their privacy. To guard these competing
interests, in camera inspections of otherwise confidential mate-
rial by experts with the credentials discussed above could be an
effective way-and one with precedent2°S-to balance the due
process rights of a defendant with the privacy rights of the
accuser.
Cases that involve claims of repressed memories of sexual
abuse evoke unpredictable and often volatile reactions from
people. Perhaps this is just the nature of the territory. After
all, the subject is our children: few social problems deserve as
much informed discussion and intervention aimed at prevention
as childhood sexual abuse and few criminals elicit the rage
often directed toward pedophiles. Thus, in such volatile cases,
generating sensible solutions to sometimes thorny legal ques-
tions can face emotional hurdles, and it is fair to say that find-
ing the truth is far from easy. But, when evaluating potential
solutions, we must keep in mind that innumerable vic-
tims-both the genuine abuse survivors and the falsely ac-
cused-are harmed when we fail to do so. It is in this spirit,
out of concern for the genuine survivors of sexual abuse trauma
and a desire not to trivialize their horrible experience, that we
advocate in camera inspection of clinical records as a sensitive
and respectful approach for attempting to determine the truth
when these cases enter litigation.
205. See supra notes 83-156 and accompanying text.
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